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Abstract. We present an oblivious transfer scheme that extends the
proposal made in [1] based in supersingular isogenies to the setting of
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1 Introduction
Oblivious transfer is considered one of the critical problems in cryptography due
the importance of the applications that can be built based on it. In particular,
it is possible to prove that oblivious transfer is complete for secure multiparty
computation [13] therefore, given an implementation of oblivious transfer, it is
possible to securely evaluate any polynomial-time computable function without
any additional primitive.
In this scheme a sender tries to communicate with a receiver in such a way
that the sender sends one of, possibly, many messages to the receiver while
remaining oblivious about the information that has been sent.
Among the recent applications of oblivious transfer we highlight blockchain
technology. To be precise oblivious transfer plays an central role in the creation
of private and verifiable smart contracts. Oblivious transfer can also be utilized
for exchange of secrets, private information retrieval, and building protocols for
signing contracts.
Currently, there exists some concern about the definition of cryptographic
algorithms able to resist attacks using a quantum computer. Among the tech-
niques presumably able to lead to quantum-resistant cryptographic schemes, we
find the use of isogenies of supersingular elliptic curves, which has proved to be
an interesting solution in the definition of key exchanges [5], digital signatures
[6] and also has been explored in the definition of hash functions [4], [17] and
oblivious transfer protocols [1].
As pointed out by [3], there is a general awareness that many proposals,
such as the isogeny-based Diffie-Hellman key exchange, should be generalized
to principally polarized abelian surfaces. Among the motivations that support
the research based on isogenies of higher genus curves we find the fact that the
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genus 2 isogeny graph is much regular than the graph in the genus 1 setting
and this gives the chance to achieve similar security levels with less isogeny
computations together with the opportunity to perform better security analysis.
Furthermore, as noted in [18], the number of 2-isogenies between elliptic curves
is three whereas abelian surfaces have fifteen (2, 2)-isogenies, and this fact may
improve the security of schemes using supersingular hyperelliptic curves.
In the literature one finds in [1] a proposal for an oblivious transfer based in
isogenies of elliptic curves. The present work follows the philosophy of [3] and
extends the results in [1] to a genus 2 setting and, using the ideas developed in
[7], defines and provides the analysis for an oblivious transfer over isogenies of
principally polarized abelian surfaces.
The structure of the document is the following: Section 1 reviews the genus 2
construction of Flynn and Ti [7] for a supersingular Diffie-Hellman key exchange
which represent the main ingredient, together with the ideas in [1], for our def-
inition for an oblivious transfer over principally polarized supersingular abelian
surfaces, which is the defined in Section 2. Finally, Section 3 revolves around the
correctness, privacity and indistinguishability of our proposal.
2 Genus 2 SIDH
This section reviews the genus 2 scheme for a SIDH [7]. Before exploring the
Flynn-Ti proposal, we consider appropriate to begin with a survey of the con-
cepts and ideas that allows us to work with jacobians and Richelot isogenies.
Those interested in a more detailed description and also interested in the struc-
ture of the graphs in the setting of genus 2 curves are invited to read [7].
2.1 Background on abelian surfaces
Let p be a prime number and consider A an abelian variety over a field Fp.
Let m ∈ Z be such that gcd(m, p) = 1. If Aˆ denotes the dual variety of A and
we write µm
(
Fp
)
for the group of m-roots of the unity in Fp, then the m-Weil
pairing is defined as
〈⋆, ⋆〉m : A
(
Fp
)
[m]× Aˆ
(
Fp
)
[m]→ µm
(
Fp
)
. (1)
Proposition 1 (Theorem 26.2.3 [8]). The m-Weil pairing is bilinear, alter-
nating and non-degenerate.
A subgroup S ⊂ A[m] is called
1. proper if for all 1 < n ≤ m : A[n] ( S;
2. maximal if S is not contained in any other subgroup of A[m], and
3. m-isotropic if the m-Weil pairing is trivial when restricted to S.
A Richelot isogeny is a (2, 2)-isogeny between jacobians JH of genus 2 curves
H , that is: its kernel is isomorphic, as a group, to F2⊗F2 and is maximal isotropic
with respect to the 2-Weil pairing.
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Those familiar with isogeny graphs know that j-invariants play a central role
in the definition of the graph. In the genus 2 context the role played by the
j-invariant is replaced with the so called G2-invariants [2]. The G2-invariants of
a genus 2 curve are absolute invariants that characterize the isomorphism class
of the curve. Let H be a genus 2 curve and let J2, J4, J6, J8 and J10 denote the
associated Igusa invariants, then the G2-invariants are defined as follows:
G = (g1, g2, g3) :=
(
J52
J10
,
J32J4
J10
,
J22J6
J10
)
. (2)
It is known (Chapter V, Section 13 [15]) that an ample divisor L of an
abelian variety A defines an isogeny ϕL : A → Aˆ called a polarization of A.
If ϕL is an isomorphism, then the polarization is called principal, and A is a
principally polarized abelian variety. The degree of a polarization is its degree
as an isogeny.
The proposal for a genus 2 SIDH in [7] follows closely the steps taken in [5].
This is possible, essentially, due to the following results, which allow us to work
with jacobians of hyperelliptic curves of genus 2:
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 [7]). Given a prime p and a finite field Fp. If A is
a principally polarized abelian surface over Fp, then:
1. A ∼= JH , where JH denotes the jacobian of some smooth (hyperelliptic) genus
2 curve H, or
2. A ∼= E1 × E2 for some elliptic curves E1 and E2.
Proof. The proof of (1) follows from Theorem 4 [16] whereas (2) is a direct
consequence of Theorem 3.1 [11].
Another key ingredient is Proposition 1 [7] which proves the fact that isoge-
nies with isotropic kernels preserve principal polarizations.
Proposition 2 (Proposition 1 [7]). Let H be a hyperelliptic curve of genus
2 over Fpn . Let K be a finite, proper and Fpn-rational subgroup of JH(Fpn).
There exists a principally polarized abelian surface A over Fpn and an isogeny
ϕ : JH → A with kernel generated by K if, and only if, K is a maximal m-
isotropic subgroup of JH [m] for some positive integer m.
Proof. The existence of A follows immediately from Theorem 10.1 (Chapter VII,
Section 10 [15]). In order to prove that it is in fact a principally polarized abelian
surface, one defines a polarization µ = [deg(ϕ)] ◦ λ on JH , which is equipped
with a principal polarization λ. One gets a polarization on JH/K of degree 1
using Theorem 16.8 and Remark 16.9 (Chapter V, Section 16 [15]).
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2.2 Set-up
The set-up of the scheme requires the selection of a prime number p = 2n3mf−1,
where f ∈ Z is small and the exponents n,m ∈ Z are such that 2n ≈ 3m.
It is also required to select a base supersingular hyperelliptic curve, which
can be chosen using the fact that coverings preserve supersingularity. We pick
H0 : y
2 = x6 + 1, which is supersingular as it is the double cover of the elliptic
curve C : y2 = x3+1, which is supersingular in Fp for p ≡ 2 (mod 3). We then use
a random sequence of Richelot isogenies to get a random principally polarized
supersingular abelian surface which, by Theorem 1, is isomorphic to the jacobian
of a supersingular hyperelliptic curve H .
We end up by selecting bases for the torsion subgroups JH [2
n] and JH [3
m]
and we do so by following Theorem 6 [14] and choosing points {P1, P2, P3, P4}
for JH [2
n] and {Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4} for JH [3
m].
2.3 First round
This stage requires Alice to choose a set of secret scalars {ai}i=1,...,12 using the
techniques described in Section 3.2 [7], together with an isogeny ϕA : JH → JA
whose kernel is generated, following Lemmata 2 and 3 and Proposition 2 in [7],
by the set
KA =
〈
4∑
i=1
[ai]Pi,
8∑
i=5
[ai]Pi−4,
12∑
i=9
[ai]Pi−8
〉
. (3)
Alice computes {ϕA(Qj)}j=1,...,4 and sends (G(JA), {ϕA(Qj)}j=1,...,4) to Bob,
where G(J⋆) denotes the G2-invariants of the curve associated to the jacobian.
At the same time, Bob takes a set of secret scalars {bi}i=1,...,12 together with
an isogeny ϕB : JH → JB whose kernel is generated by
KB =
〈
4∑
i=1
[bi]Qi,
8∑
i=5
[bi]Qi−4,
12∑
i=9
[bi]Qi−8
〉
. (4)
Bob computes {ϕB(Qj)}j=1,...,4 and sends the tuple (G(JB), {ϕB(Pj)}j=1,...,4)
to Alice.
2.4 Second round
Once Alice receives the tuple (G(JB), {ϕB(Pj)}j=1,...,4), she will be able to obtain
JB from G(JB) and to compute
KBA =
〈
4∑
i=1
[ai]ϕB(Pi),
8∑
i=5
[ai]ϕB(Pi−4),
12∑
i=
[ai]ϕB(Pi−8)
〉
, (5)
which generates the kernel of a (2n, 2n−k, 2k)-isogeny ϕ′A : JB → JBA.
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Similarly, after receiving Alice’s tuple, Bob will be able to obtain JA and to
compute the kernel of a (2m, 2m−k, 2k)-isogeny ϕ′B : JA → JAB generated by
the set
KAB =
〈
4∑
i=1
[bi]ϕA(Qi),
8∑
i=5
[bi]ϕA(Qi−4),
12∑
i=9
[bi]ϕA(Qi−8)
〉
. (6)
We observe that Bob and Alice can use the sets G, associated to JAB and
JBA, as their shared secret due to the following isomorphism, from which we
deduce the correctness of the scheme:
JAB =
JA
ϕA(KB)
∼=
JH
〈KA,KB〉
∼=
JB
ϕB(KA)
= JBA. (7)
3 Genus 2 oblivious transfer
In this section we introduce the extension to genus 2 curves of the proposal for
a supersingular isogeny oblivious transfer in [1]. We will denote the scheme as
2-SIOT.
3.1 Set-up
Let us consider a prime p = 2n3mf − 1 for f ∈ Z small and exponents n,m ∈ Z
such that 2n ≈ 3m. Fix a supersingular hyperelliptic curve H following the
criteria of Section 2 and use a random sequence of Richelot isogenies to get a
random principally polarized supersingular abelian surface. Finally we consider
generating sets {P1, P2, P3, P4} and {Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4} for JH [2
n] and JH [3
m] re-
spectively.
3.2 First round
In this first stage Alice receives to messages m0,m1 from the set of messages
M. She will have to select secret scalars {ai}i=1,...,12, following Section 3.2 [7],
together with an isogeny ϕA : JH → JA whose kernel is generated by
KA =
〈
4∑
i=1
[ai]Pi,
8∑
i=5
[ai]Pi−4,
12∑
i=9
[ai]Pi−8
〉
. (8)
Furthermore Alice computes {ϕA(Qj)}j=1,...,4 and G(JA) in order to define
her public key pkA = (G(JA), {ϕA(Qj)}j=1,...,4) and sends it to Bob.
At the same time Bob gets as input a bit β ∈ {0, 1}. He is required to select
a set of secret scalars {bi}i=1,...,12, according to Section 3.2 [7], together with an
isogeny ϕB : JH → JB whose kernel is generated by
KB =
〈
4∑
i=1
[bi]Qi,
8∑
i=5
[bi]Qi−4,
12∑
i=9
[bi]Qi−8
〉
. (9)
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After receiving pkA, Bob checks if {ϕA(Qj)}j=1,2,3,4 ∈ JA[3
m]. If not, pkA
is rejected. Otherwise Bob computes elements U1, U2, U3, U4 ∈ JB[2
n] in order
to define Rj = ϕB(Pj) − βUj for j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Bob defines his public key as
pkB = (G(JB), {Rj}j=1,2,3,4). This key is sent to Alice.
3.3 Second round
After receiving Bob’s public key, Alice checks if {Rj}j=1,2,3,4 ∈ JB[2
n]. As in
Bob’s situation, if the condition does not hold, Bob’s public key is rejected.
Otherwise Alice computes the set, for k = 0, 1:
KBAk =
{
4∑
i=1
[ai]ϕB(Pi)− βUi + kUi,
8∑
i=5
[ai]ϕB(Pi−4)− βUi−4 + kUi−4,
12∑
i=9
[ai]ϕB(Pi−8)− βUi−8 + kUi−8
}
,
(10)
which generates the kernel for an isogeny ϕ′Ak : JB → JBAk . Let us denote
with Gk the set G associated to JBAk . Finally, given a symmetric encryption
scheme (Enc,Dec), Alice computes ck := Enc(Gk,mk) for k = 0, 1 and sends
the pair (c0, c1) to Bob.
On the other side, Bob computes the set
KAB =
{
4∑
i=1
[bi]ϕA(Qi),
8∑
i=5
[bi]ϕA(Qi−4),
12∑
i=9
[bi]ϕA(Qi−8)
}
, (11)
which generates the kernel of an isogeny ϕ′B : JA → JAB. Bob will compute
G(JAB) := Gβ which will allow him to perform mβ = Dec(Gβ , cβ).
Below follows the pseudocode view of the 2-SIOT protocol:
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Set-up
Prime p = 2n3mf − 1
f, n,m ∈ Z s.t. f small, 2n ≈ 3m
H supersingular hyperelliptic curve
{P1, P2, P3, P4} gen. JH [2
n]
{Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4} gen. JH [3
m]
Alice Bob
Input: m0,m1 ∈ M Input: β ∈ {0, 1}
Output: none Output: mβ
Secret: {ai}i∈{1,...,12} Secret: {bi}i∈{1,...,12}
Isogeny: ϕA : JH → JA Isogeny: ϕB : JH → JB〈
4∑
i=1
[ai]Pi,
8∑
i=5
[ai]Pi−4,
12∑
i=9
[ai]Pi−8
〉 〈
4∑
i=1
[bi]Qi,
8∑
i=5
[bi]Qi−4,
12∑
i=9
[bi]Qi−8
〉
{ϕA(Qj)}j∈{1,2,3,4} {ϕB(Pj)}j∈{1,2,3,4}
G(JA) G(JB)
pkA = (G(JA), {ϕA(Qj)}j=1,2,3,4)
pkA
{ϕA(Qj)}j=1,2,3,4 /∈ JA[3
m]⇒ Reject
{Uj}j=1,2,3,4 ∈ JB [2
n]
Rj = ϕB(Pj)− βUj , j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
pkB = (G(JB), {Rj}j=1,2,3,4)
pkB
{Rj}j=1,2,3,4 /∈ JB [2
n]⇒ Reject
k ∈ {0, 1}
Ti,k := [ai]ϕB(Pi)− βUi + kUi〈
4∑
i=1
Ti,k,
8∑
i=5
Ti−4,k,
12∑
i=9
Ti−8,k
〉
ϕ′Ak : JB → JBAk
Gk = G(JBAk )
ck = Enc(Gk,mk), ∀k ∈ {0, 1}
(c0, c1)
ϕj = ϕA(Qj), j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}〈
4∑
i=1
[bi]ϕi,
8∑
i=5
[bi]ϕi−4,
12∑
i=9
[bi]ϕi−8
〉
ϕ′B : JA → JAB
Gβ = G(JAB)
mβ = Dec(Gβ, cβ)
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4 Correctness and privacy
This section is devoted to check the correctness, the privacy and the indistin-
guishability of the 2-SIOT proposal. The reader will realise that many of the
arguments used in [1] can be extended to our setting with a few but tedious
computations. The first part is focused on the computational problems which
are assumed to be hard in a quantum setting. Correctness is immediately checked
in a second subsection and we finish by justifying the privacy and the indistin-
guishability of our proposal.
4.1 Background on two-party computation
A map ε : N → [0,+∞) is negligible if for every positive polynomial Q ∈ Fp[x]
and for every n ∈ N the following condition holds: ε(n) < (Q(n))−1.
A probability ensemble X = {X(n, a)}n∈N,a∈{0,1}⋆ is a sequence of random
variables. The variable n represents the security parameter, whereas a represents
the inputs of each party.
Two distribution ensembles X and Y are computationally indistinguishable,
and we write it as X
c
≡ Y , if for every non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm
D there exists a negligible map ε such that:
|P (D(X(n, a)) = 1)− P (D(Y (n, a)) = 1)| ≤ ε(n), ∀n ∈ N, ∀a ∈ {0, 1}⋆. (12)
The following concepts are well known (Section 7.2 [10]):
A two-party problem can be cast by defining a random process that maps
pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs. Such a process is called a functionality and
is denoted by a map of the form F : {0, 1}⋆ × {0, 1}⋆ → {0, 1}⋆ × {0, 1}⋆, with
F (x, y) = (F1(x, y), F2(x, y)). Here x denotes the input of first party, and y
denotes the input of the second party. After evaluating F , the first party should
receive F1(x, y) and the second party should receive F2(x, y).
Let F = (F1, F2) be a functionality and π a two-party protocol for computing
F . The view of the first (resp. second) party during an execution of π on (x, y)
is denoted by viewi(x, y) is (x, r,m1, . . . ,mt) (resp. (y, r,m1, . . . ,mt)), where r
is the outcome of the first (resp. second) party’s internal coin tosses and mj
represents the j-th message it has received.
A concept particularly elusive is that of malicious party. We follow Section
7.2.3 [10] in order to discuss some ideas about it.
When we are working in a malicious setting, it is important to keep in mind
that there is no way to force parties to participate in the protocol. One malicious
behaviour could simply be not participating in the protocol. This implies, some-
how, that if one of the parties is participating against its will, another admitted
behaviour in a malicious setting could be aborting at any time, even once one
of the parties gets the expected output. Another important fact to bare in mind
is that in a malicious setting, it is not possible to determine the inputs of a
malicious party.
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In general, when talking about malicious parties, we admit the following
situations:
1. Parties refusing to participate in the protocol, once it has been started.
2. Parties substituting their local input.
3. Parties aborting the protocol prematurely.
4.2 Supersingular isogeny problems
It is important to observe that the security analysis of the genus 1 problems
extends to our setting easily and so, those interested in further details are invited
to read [9].
Keeping the notations used so far, let us consider a supersingular hyperelliptic
curve H over Fp2 with genus 2 together with independent bases {Pi}i=1,...4 and
{Qi}i=1,...4 for JH [2
n] and JH [3
m] respectively.
Problem 1 (DSSI: Decisional supersingular isogeny problem). Let H ′ be another
supersingular hyperelliptic curve over Fp2 with genus 2. Decide whether JH′ is
(3m, 3m)-isogenous to JH .
Problem 2 (CSSI: Computational supersingular isogeny problem). Let HA be a
supersingular hyperelliptic curve over Fp2 with genus 2. Let ϕA : JH → JA be
an isogeny whose kernel is generated by
KA =
{
4∑
i=1
[ai]Pi,
8∑
i=5
[ai]Pi−4,
12∑
i=9
[ai]Pi−8
}
(13)
for some ai ∈ F2n . Given JA and {ϕA(Qj}j=1,...,4, find generators for KA.
Problem 3 (SSCDH: Supersingular computational Diffie-Hellman). Let us con-
sider ϕA : JH → JA an isogeny whose kernel is generated by
KA =
{
4∑
i=1
[ai]Pi,
8∑
i=5
[ai]Pi−4,
12∑
i=9
[ai]Pi−8
}
, (14)
for some ai ∈ F2n and let ϕB : JH → JB whose kernel is generated by
KB =
{
4∑
i=1
[bi]Qi,
8∑
i=5
[bi]Qi−4,
12∑
i=9
[bi]Qi−8
}
(15)
for some bi ∈ F3m . Given {ϕA(Qj), ϕB(Pj)}j=1,...,4 and the jacobians JA, JB,
find the set G associated to JH〈KA,KB〉 .
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4.3 Correctness
The correctness of this proposal relies on the fact that both parties are honest,
that is just one of the messagesmβ = Dec(Gβ , cβ) should be decrypted. We need
to prove that if the bit β chosen by Bob agrees with the element k chosen by
Alice, then it is possible to share a secret. This follows from
JAB ∼=
JA
KAB
∼=
JH
〈KA,KB〉
∼= JBA, (16)
therefore G(JAB) = G(JBAk).
4.4 Privacy
Let us denote with Alice and with Bob the malicious alter egos of Alice and Bob,
respectively. In order to prove the privacity of the proposal, we use the following
definition:
Definition 1 (Definition 2.6.1 [12]). A two-message two-party probabilistic
polynomial-time protocol is private oblivious transfer if the following holds:
1. Non-triviality: If Alice and Bob follow the protocol, then after an execution
in which Alice has for input any pair of m0,m1 ∈M, and Bob has for input
a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, then the output of Bob is mb.
2. Privacy for Alice: For every non-uniform polynomial-time Alice and every
auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}⋆, the following condition holds:
{viewAlice(Alice(1
n, z),Bob(1n, 0))}n∈N
c
≡
{viewAlice(Alice(1
n, z),Bob(1n, 1))}n∈N.
3. Privacy for Bob: For every non-uniform deterministic polynomial-time Bob,
every auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}⋆ and ever m0,m1,m ∈ {0, 1}
⋆ such that
|m0| = |m1| = |m| one of the conditions below hold:
{viewBob(Alice(1
n, (m0,m1)),Bob(1
n, z))}n∈N
c
≡
{viewBob(Alice(1
n, (m0,m)),Bob(1
n, z))}n∈N.
or
{viewBob(Alice(1
n, (m0,m1)),Bob(1
n, z))}n∈N
c
≡
{viewBob(Alice(1
n, (m,m1)),Bob(1
n, z))}n∈N.
The 2-SIOT protocol is non-trivial because Bob can compute the jacobian
JAB from pkA and obtain Gβ , thus mβ = Dec(G, cβ) is such that G(JAB) = Gβ
and β is a unique element secretly chosen by Bob.
We observe that conditions 2 and 3 in the previous definition follow using
the arguments in [1]. In particular, we have the following analogous results:
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Lemma 1 (Lemma 1 [1]). Alice on input pkB cannot guess the bit β with
probability greater that 12 + ε(n), for some negligible function ε(n) and n ∈ N.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is quite technical and can be easily extended to
our context after carefully checking the computations. Those interested in the
details are welcome to check them in [1].
Lemma 2 (cf. Lemma 2 [1]). Assuming that SSCDH (Problem 3) is hard,
Bob cannot compute two distinct sets G0 and G1.
Proof. This result follows immediately by reducing to absurd: if we assume that
Bob is able to compute two distinct sets G0 and G1 then he would violate SSCDH
(Problem 3).
Theorem 2 (cf. Theorem 3.4.1 [1]). Assuming that the decisional Diffie-
Hellman problem and the supersingular computational Diffie-Hellman problem
are hard for JH(Fp2), the 2-SIOT proposal is private oblivious transfer.
4.5 Indistinguishability
Let us assume a setting in which Alice receives pkB from Bob. A priori, Alice
is not able to decide whether she received (G(JB), {ϕB(Pj)}j=1,2,3,4) or if she
received (G(JB), {ϕB(Pj) − Uj}j=1,2,3,4), that is: Alice is not able to decide if
Bob got β = 0 or β = 1. In order to overcome this problem, Alice could use the
Weil pairing.
Let us assume that all pairings have order 2n. The points ϕB(Pj) satisfy
〈ϕB(Pi), ϕB(Pj)〉2n = (〈Pi, Pj〉2n)
3m for each 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 4. If the equality does
not hold for both (G(JB), {ϕB(Pi)}i) and (G(JB), {ϕB(Pi) − Ui}i), then Alice
would be able to know the key used by Bob.
Therefore, as Alice can add any multiple of {Uj}j=1,2,3,4 to {ϕB(Pj)}j=1,2,3,4
and look for a mismatch, we need to have1, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and ∀λ ∈ F2n :
〈ϕB(Pi) + λUi, ϕB(Pj) + λUj〉 =
∏
i<j
〈ϕB(Pi), ϕB(Pj)〉. (17)
For each i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, we write ϕi := ϕB(Pi) and recall that as Ui ∈ JB[2
n],
then
Ui = αiϕ1 + βiϕ2 + γiϕ3 + δiϕ4. (18)
For the sake of simplicity, we consider the case i = 1, j = 2. Then condition
(17) implies:
1 Note the abuse of notation in the Weil pairing.
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〈ϕ1 + λU1, ϕ2 + λU2〉
= 〈ϕ1 + λ(α1ϕ1 + β1ϕ2 + γ1ϕ3 + δ1ϕ4), ϕ2 + λ(α2ϕ1 + β2ϕ2 + γ2ϕ3 + δ2ϕ4)〉
= 〈(1 + λα1)ϕ1, (1 + λβ2)ϕ2〉〈(1 + λα1)ϕ1, λγ2ϕ3〉〈(1 + λα1)ϕ1, λδ2ϕ2〉
· 〈λβ1ϕ2, λα2ϕ1〉〈λβ1ϕ2, λγ2ϕ3〉〈λβ1ϕ2, λδ2ϕ4〉〈λγ1ϕ3, (1 + λβ2)ϕ2〉
· 〈λγ1ϕ3, λα2ϕ1〉〈λγ1ϕ3, λδ2ϕ4〉〈λδ1ϕ4, (1 + λβ2)ϕ2〉〈λδ1ϕ4, λα2ϕ1〉
· 〈λδ1ϕ4, λγ2ϕ3〉
= 〈ϕ1, ϕ2)
(1+λα1)(1+λβ2)〈ϕ1, ϕ3〉
(1+λα1)λγ2〈ϕ1, ϕ4〉
(1+λα1)λδ2
· 〈ϕ2, ϕ1〉
λ2β1α2〈ϕ2, ϕ3〉
λ2β1γ2〈ϕ2, ϕ4〉
λ2β1δ2〈ϕ3, ϕ2〉
λγ1(1+λβ2)
· 〈ϕ3, ϕ1〉
λ2γ1α2〈ϕ3, ϕ4〉
λ2γ1δ2〈ϕ4, ϕ2〉
λδ1(1+λβ2)〈ϕ4, ϕ1〉
λ2γ1α2〈ϕ4, ϕ3〉
λ2δ1γ2
= 〈ϕ1, ϕ2〉
λ2(α1β2−α2β1)+λ(β2+α1)+1〈ϕ1, ϕ3〉
λα2γ1+λ(γ2+α2γ1)
· 〈ϕ1, ϕ4〉
λ2(γ2α1−γ1α2)+λδ2〈ϕ2, ϕ3〉
λ2(β1γ2−β2γ1)−λγ1〈ϕ2, ϕ4〉
λ2(β1δ2−β2δ1)−λδ2
· 〈ϕ3, ϕ4〉
λ2(γ1δ2−δ1γ2) = 〈ϕ1, ϕ2〉〈ϕ1, ϕ3〉〈ϕ1, ϕ4〉〈ϕ2, ϕ3〉〈ϕ2, ϕ4〉〈ϕ3, ϕ4〉.
Therefore: 

λ2(α1β2 − α2β1) + λ(β2 + α1) + 1 = 1
−λ2α2γ1 + λ(α2γ1 + γ2) = 1
λ2(δ2α1 − γ1α2) + λδ2 = 1
λ2(β1γ2 − β2δ1)− λγ1 = 1
λ2(β1δ2 − β2δ1)− λδ2 = 1
λ2(γ1δ2 − δ1γ2) = 1
(19)
Observe that the first condition in (19) implies:
λ2(α1β2 − α2β1) + λ(β2 + α1) = 0⇔ β
2
2 + α2β1 = 0 (20)
After performing the above tedious but straightforward computations for
each pair i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} we are able to state the following result:
Proposition 3. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} denote the variable sets α, β, γ, δ and the
subindices {i, j} specify the variable. Then the identity j2j +ijji = 0 for each pair
{i, j} ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is a necessary condition for Alice not to be able to distinguish
between (G(JB), {Ri}i) or (G(JB), {ϕB(Pi)}i).
Remark 1. As an example, for indices i = 2, j = 3 the condition in Proposition
3 becomes γ23 + β3γ2 = 0. In the case i = j we obtain α1 = β2 = γ3 = δ4 = 0.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a post-quantum protocol for an oblivious transfer based in
principally polarized supersingular abelian surfaces combining and adjusting the
ideas of [1] and [7].
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We have proved that the proposal is private in settings with malicious sender
and/or receiver and we also have given necessary conditions for the proposal
to be undistinguishable in a setting involving a malicious sender. Furthermore
we have presented the mathematical problems that provide the post-quantum
security of the proposal. Nevertheless, the analysis of the situation preventing
possible decryptions from a malicious receiver remains open.
It is important to bare in mind that this proposal follows the ideas from
[7], and therefore it suffers from the same bad habits: although the protocol
is implementable, it is too slow to be practical, therefore improvements on the
algorithms must be obtained in order to get a functional version of 2-SIOT.
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